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L Introduction
In our "war on terrorism," national security interests may constitute a
legitimate reason for sacrificing other interests, except for one
uncompromising interest: the human right against torture. For the U.S.
government, the fear of terrorist attacks has triggered a narrow interpretation
of the definition of torture and led to increased flexibility in the interrogation
techniques applied to terrorism suspects. As evident in the legal memoranda
prepared by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) for the Department of
Justice, the U.S. interpretation of torture is narrower than that of international
law as well as of ordinary domestic law. This redefinition has, to varying
degrees, given rise to three problems: the tragic prisoner abuse in Abu
Ghraib, indefinite detention with little protection against torture in
Guantanamo Bay, and the dangerous policy of rendition.
This Note argues that redefining torture is ineffective in furthering
U.S. interests in the war on terrorism and undermines both human dignity
and respect for racial and cultural differences. Part II of this Note identifies
areas where the redefinition has led to tragic results. Part HI compares the
narrow interpretation of torture in the two OLC memoranda and the McCain
Amendment with the broader interpretation in the U.N. Convention Against
Torture, 18 U.S.C. § 2340, and the Torture Victim Protection Act. Part IV
analyzes the effects of the redefinition in terms of policy and critical race
theory. Part V suggests two potential solutions for eliminating the use of
torture: the creation of a transparent system and the enforcement of strict
adherence to international norms and values.
II. Problems Created by the Redefinition of Torture
A. Abu Ghraib
Abu Ghraib is an example of the abusive use of interrogation
methods in the name of fighting against terrorism. Allegations of detainees
at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq compel one to question the scope of torture.'
Statements from thirteen detainees taken shortly after a soldier reported the
I See Scott Higham & Joe Stephens, New Details of Prison Abuse Emerge: Abu Ghraib
Detainees' Statements Describe Sexual Humiliation and Savage Beatings, WASH. POST, May 21, 2004, at
A01 (describing in detail various allegations of prisoners at Abu Ghraib).
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incidents to military investigators in January 2004 allege that the detainees
were "being ridden like animals, sexually fondled by female soldiers and
forced to retrieve their food from toilets. '2 The detainees were also savagely
beaten, force-fed pork and liquor, sexually humiliated and assaulted with
rape and sodomy, and forced to masturbate in front of female soldiers.3
Hiadar Sabar Abed Miktub al-Aboodi, detainee No. 13077, said American
soldiers forced the detainees to walk like dogs on their hands and knees and
started hitting the detainees hard on their faces and chests if they did not bark
like dogs. He also said, "[aifter that, they took us to our cells, took the
mattresses out and dropped water on the floor and they made us sleep on our
stomachs on the floor with the bags on our head and they took pictures of
everything. ,
5
While it may be easy to shift all the blame for the abuse to a few
individuals, the question of the precise role of those highest up on the chain
of command cannot be ignored. It is important to determine whether the
narrow interpretation of torture by senior officials contributed to the poor
oversight of the Abu Ghraib prison.6 An Army report by retired Colonel
Stuart A. Herrington showed that U.S. military leaders in Iraq were told of
allegations of detainee abuse even before January 2004, when they first
learned about the situation in Abu Ghraib.7 Another Army inquiry by Major
General George R. Fay concluded that the U.S. commanders played no role
in ordering or permitting the abuse, but that they failed to provide sufficient
supervision and leadership. 8  In fact, "[w]ithout adequate oversight and
discipline, an environment was created in which shifting guidelines for
control over an estimated 45,000 detainees, and evolving rules for
interrogations, could be interpreted freely and even disregarded."9
Furthermore, the Schlesinger Report found that the "abuses were not just the





6 See Mark A. Drumbi, "Lesser Evils" in the War on Terrorism, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
335, 340 (2004) ("Independent and Army inquiries into the prison abuses suggest that senior officials,
while not personally culpable, are to be faulted for failing to exercise proper oversight.").
7 See Josh White, U.S. Generals in Iraq Were Told of Abuse Early, Inquiry Finds, WASH. POST,
Dec. 1, 2004, at A01 (describing the report warning Army generals of detainee abuse by members of an
elite military and CIA task force more than a month before the Army investigators received photographs
from Abu Ghraib).
8 See Thom Shanker & Kate Zernike, Abuse Inquiry Faults Officers on Leadership, N.Y. TUMES,
Aug. 19, 2004, at Al (stating that an Army inquiry found that senior U.S. commanders, because of both
inadequate leadership and insufficient resources, created conditions that allowed abuses to occur at Abu
Ghraib).
9 Id.
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than the failure of a few leaders to enforce proper discipline .... There is
both institutional and personal responsibility at higher levels."10 Lastly, the
Church Report found that early warning signs of serious abuses did not
receive enough attention and that the unit commanders did not get clear
instructions that might have stopped the abuses." The Report also faulted
senior officials for failing to establish clear interrogation polices, even




The U.S. military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba has detained 450
foreign nationals as of July 2006.'3 Pursuant to a 1903 Lease Agreement
executed with the newly independent Republic of Cuba in the aftermath of
the Spanish-American War, the U.S. has occupied the Guantanamo Base,
which is comprised of forty-five square miles of land and water along the
southeast coast of Cuba. 14 The United States exercises complete jurisdiction
and control over the Base while it recognizes the continuance of the ultimate
sovereignty of Cuba over the area.
1 5
The American policy of detaining foreign nationals at Guantanamo
is a controversial issue, largely because of allegations of egregious human
rights abuses at the base. The International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) criticized the military base for the quality of interrogation methods
used against the detainees.' 6 The ICRC charged that the U.S. military has
"intentionally used psychological and sometimes physical coercion
'tantamount to torture' on prisoners at Guantanamo Bay."' 17 For example,
detainees were subject to beatings, exposure to loud and persistent noise and
music, humiliating acts, solitary confinement, temperature extremes, and
10 See Bradley Graham & Josh White, Top Pentagon Leaders Faulted in Prison Abuse: Oversight
by Rumsfeld and Others Inadequate, Panel Says, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2004, at A01 (noting that an
independent panel faulted the Pentagon's top leaders for failing to exercise adequate oversight and for
allowing conditions that led to the detainee abuse).
t1 See Eric Schmitt, New Interrogation Rules Set for Detainees in Iraq, N.Y; TIMES, Mar. 10,
2005, at Al (describing the naval inspector general inquiry that criticized the little control exerted over the
conduct of interrogations in Iraq).
12 Id.
13 Josh White, Hurdle to Closing Guantanamo: Where to Put Inmates, WASH. POST, July 2,
2006, at A08.
14 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,471 (2004).
15 Id.
16 See Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30,
2004, at Al (describing the report of the International Committee of the Red Cross following a month-
long visit to Guantanamo in June 2004).
17 Id.
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forced into bodily positions.1 8 This is the first time the ICRC has asserted in
such strong terms that both physical and psychological treatment of detainees
amounted to torture.
19
One possible contribution to the alleged use of torture in
Guantanamo Bay is the U.S. government's attempt to avoid judicial
intervention in the handling of terrorism suspects. In Rasul v. Bush,20 the
Supreme Court held that United States courts have jurisdiction to consider
challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured
abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay.2'
In response to this decision, the Pentagon held new hearings, called the
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs), in order to determine whether
each detainee met the definition of an enemy combatant.22  The
determination of enemy combatant status is important in that a wrongfully
detained noncombatant ostensibly would be released from detention at
Guantanamo Bay.23  Furthermore, if the CSRTs find a detainee to be an
enemy combatant, the detainee would receive the prisoner of war status
under Article 4 of the Geneva Convention only if he is a lawful combatant.
24
If a combatant follows the international laws of armed conflict and thus
becomes a lawful combatant during war, combatant's privilege applies and
the combatant is immune from prosecution for lawful combat activities.25
Unlawful combatants are those who are not legally authorized to engage in
armed conflict but do so without authority.26
An order establishing CSRTs stated that every detainee would be
notified of the opportunity to contest designation as an enemy combatant, of
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004) (allowing federal jurisdiction to hear challenges
of foreign detainees at Guantanamo Bay). This case involved two Australian citizens and twelve Kuwaiti
citizens who were captured abroad during hostilities between the United States and the Taliban. Id. at
471. The Court considered whether U.S. courts lack jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of
the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at
Guantanamo Bay. Id. at 470. The Court reasoned that the federal courts have jurisdiction over the
petitioners because petitioners contended that they were being held in federal custody in violation of the
laws of the United States. Id. at 483.
21 Id.
22 See John Mintz, Pentagon Sets Hearings for 595 Detainees, WASH. POST, July 8, 2004, at AOl
(stating that the Pentagon announced that it would hold hearings for detainees at the Guantanamo Bay
prison in response to the Supreme Court ruling that the government was jailing terrorism suspects without
due process).
2 See Joseph P. Bialke, AI-Qaeda & Taliban Unlawful Combatant Detainees, Unlawful
Belligerency, and the International Laws of Armed Conflict, 55 A.F. L. REV. 1, 8 (2004) (noting that
noncombatants include protected civilians, interned civilians, military medical personnel, military
chaplains, civilian war correspondents and journalists, and United Nations peacekeepers).
24 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, opened for signature
Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3316,75 U.N.T.S. 135.
2 Bialke, supra note 23, at 9.
26 Id. at4.
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the opportunity to consult with and be assisted by a personal representative,
and of the right to seek a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. federal courts.
27
Three neutral commissioned officers of the U.S. Armed Forces would hear
and decide each detainee's case with a preponderance of evidence, but "there
shall be a rebuttable presumption in favor of the Government's evidence.
28
Through this process, thirty-three out of 558 detainees were deemed to have
been "improperly labeled enemy combatants" at the CSRT hearings, and five
of those thirty-three have been released because of difficulties in making
arrangements to have them transferred to their home countries.29
Although the creation of CSRTs indicates the government's response
to the Supreme Court's ruling, the actual function of these tribunals is to
buttress the government's case when confronted by defense attorneys in
federal court hearings.3a In mandating an order establishing the CSRTs,
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz stated that the sole intention
of the order to create CSRTs was to "improve management within the
Department of Defense concerning its detention of enemy combatants at
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, and is not intended to, and does not,
create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law, in
equity, or otherwise by any party against the United States."' Moreover, the
officials said that the essential function of the new hearings was to help
government lawyers argue their cases for continued detention in the habeas
corpus hearings, reasoning that a judge need not inquire too deeply into the
cases since the government has already deliberated on each case.32
Nevertheless, many detainee lawyers and detainees have criticized
the CSRTs for their allegedly unfair review process. For example, the
CSRTs define an enemy combatant as an individual "who was part of or
supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged
in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes
any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported
hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces. 3 3 Several detainee lawyers argued
that this definition of enemy combatant was "so broad that the military has
incarcerated people who never took up arms against the United States ...
27 Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary of the
Navy, Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunals (July 7, 2004), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d2OO4O7O7review.pdf [hereinafter Order Establishing CSRTs].
28 Id.
29 See Neil A. Lewis, Guantanamo Detainees Make Their Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2005, at
A21 (referring to the procedures of the CSRTs preceding the Administrative Review Boards).
30 See Mintz, supra note 22, at A01 (noting that that the new tribunals were designed for the
government to argue that it has been deliberative in its detention decisions and afforded due process).
31 Order Establishing CSRTs, supra note 27.
32 Mintz, supra note 22, at A01.
33 Order Establishing CSRTs, supra note 27.
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and professionals who say they unknowingly gave money to charitable
organizations that funded al Qaeda. 3 4  Furthermore, one detainee who has
been ruled to be "no longer an enemy combatant" thought the review process
was unfair and that "the definition of the term 'enemy combatant' was so
broad that it could not be understood. 35 In addition to the detainee lawyers
and detainees, Judge Joyce Hens Green of the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia joined their criticism of CSRTs by holding in In
re Guantanamo Detainee Cases36 that CSRTs were unconstitutional because
they denied the detainees' fundamental right to due process under the Fifth
Amendment.37 Regarding the allegations of torture, Judge Green stated that
"the CSRT did not sufficiently consider whether the evidence upon which
the tribunal relied in making its 'enemy combatant' determinations was
coerced from the detainees."3 8  Lawyer Eugene R. Fidell, an expert on
military law, said that Judge Green's ruling was "one of a growing number of
court decisions limiting White House efforts to claim unbridled power in the
name of combating terrorism."
39
Similarly, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,4° the district court found that the
CSRT was not a competent tribunal to determine Hamdan's status as a
prisoner of war under the Geneva Conventions because the CSRT was
established to decide whether a detainee is properly detained as an enemy
combatant for purposes of continued detention.41 However, the D.C. Circuit
Court reversed the judgment, stating that Congress authorized the President
to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the
34 Carol D. Leonnig & Julie Tate, Detainee Hearings Bring New Details and Disputes, WASH.
PosT, Dec. 11, 2004, at AO1.
35 Josh White & Julie Tate, In Guantanamo Bay Documents, Prisoners Plead for Release: U.S.
Makes First Public Accounting of Detainees, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2006, at A08.
36 See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 481 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that
the detainees have due process right and that the CSRT procedures are unconstitutional for failing to
comport with the requirements of due process). In this case, eleven detainees held as enemy combatants
at Guantanamo Bay filed habeas corpus petitions. Id. at 445. The court considered the contours of the
Fifth Amendment right as it applies to the alleged enemy combatants. Id. at 465. The court stated that the
detainees were entitled to the Fifth Amendment due process right, which is one of the fundamental rights
recognized by the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 464. The court also noted that the CSRT's reliance on
statements allegedly obtained through torture was not constitutional. Id. at 472.
37 Id. at 481.
39 ld. at 473.
39 Carol D. Leonnig, Judge Rules Detainee Tribunals Illegal, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2005, at AO1.
40 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 162 (D.D.C. 2004) (finding that Hamdan had
not been determined by a competent tribunal to be an offender triable under the law of war and that the
procedures established for the Military Commission by the President's order were contrary to or
inconsistent with those applicable to courts-martial). In Hamdan, petitioner was captured in Afghanistan
in late 2001 during a time of hostilities in that country that followed the terrorist attacks in the United
States. Id. at 155. Hamdan was detained by American military forces and transferred to Guantanamo
Bay. Id. The court stated that no proper determination has been made that Hamdan was an offender
triable by military tribunal. Id. at 158.
41 Id. at 162.
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U.S., including establishing military commissions to try detainees like
42Hamdan. The Circuit Court disagreed with the district court's holding that
Hamdan could not be tried by a military commission unless a competent
tribunal determined his prisoner of war status.43 Instead, the Circuit Court
found that a military commission is a competent tribunal where Hamdan
could assert his claim to his prisoner of war status.44 On March 28, 2006, the
U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument in the case. At the Supreme Court,
Hamdan argued that the military commission should not charge "a violation
in a stateless, territoryless conflict, something as to which the full laws of
war have never applied. '45 Hamdan also argued that public interest requires
some limits to be placed on military commissions because the lack of
structural limits would "give the President ... essentially [a] blank check
... ,46 Hamdan continued to claim that the CSRT was not a competent
tribunal and that a different tribunal must make a determination of his
prisoner of war status.47 On June 29, 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court
concluded that the military commission convened to try Hamdan lacked
power to proceed because its structure and procedures violated the Uniform
Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions.48 The Court
disapproved of the military commission's policies of excluding the accused
from any part of the proceeding, precluding the accused from ever learning
evidence presented against him, admitting testimonial hearsay and evidence
obtained through coercion, and permitting the use of unsworn testimony and
witnesses' written statements.49
The United States began a new set of proceedings called the
Administrative Review Boards (ARB) for further determinations operating
after a CSRT finding. 50 Consisting of panels of three military officers, the
ARB hearings allow detainees to tell their stories without lawyers and
dispute accusations that they were part of the Taliban or allied with Al
Qaeda.51 However, in order to be released, the detainees "must persuade the
board that no matter their history, they are not a threat to the United States or
its allies. 52 Like the CSRT hearings, most of the evidence used in ARB
42 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33,37 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
43 Id. at 36.
44 Id. at 43.
45 Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2006 WL 846264 (No. 05-184).
46 Id. at 20.
47 See id. at 35 (arguing against Rumsfeld's claim that Hamdan could have brought his claim to
prisoner of war status before the CSRT and the military commission).
48 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No. 05-184, 2006 U.S. LEXIs 5185, at 22 (June 29, 2006).
49 Id. at 97-98.





proceedings comes from classified reports, which are not available for the
detainees to see. 53 Although these proceedings seem to provide the detainees
with more process, the ARB hearings raise "concerns regarding the role of
law in the struggle against terrorism.
'' 4
To address the concerns raised by the proceedings, on December 30,
2005, Congress enacted the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. 55 Although the
act barred torture, the act also amended the habeas corpus statute to provide
that no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien
detained at Guantanamo Bay or any other action against the United States or
its agents relating to any aspect of the detention.56 Senator Lindsey Graham
asserted that U.S. courts have become clogged by "frivolous claims" on
behalf of nearly 300 detainees in Cuba and favored "denying foreign
terrorism suspects the same rights in federal court that are afforded to U.S.
citizens. 
5 7
C. The Policy of Rendition
If Guantanamo Bay illustrates the problem of moving away from
judicial intervention under the color of national law, the policy of rendition
reflects the U.S. government's resistance to assuming responsibility to act
under any law. Rendition is "a system of sending captives to other countries
with less progressive human rights standards in order to interrogate them
more aggressively, [and it] often results in torture. 5 8 The CIA has taken this
approach "to transfer captives it picks up abroad to third countries willing to
hold them indefinitely and without public proceedings."59  Rendition
involves arrangements between the United States and other countries, such as
Egypt, Jordan, and Afghanistan, that agree to have local security services
hold terrorism suspects in their facilities for interrogation by CIA and foreign
liaison officers. 6° Although rendition originated in the 1990s "as a way of
picking up criminals abroad, such as drug kingpins, and delivering them to
courts in the United States or other countries," the practice has changed since
53 Id.
54 Mark A. Drumbi, Guantanamo, Rasul, and the Twilight of Law, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 897, 900
(2005).
55 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001-1006 (2005).
5 Id.
57 Josh White, Detainees Face Limited Access to Courts: But Bill Awaiting Bush Signature
Would Shield Terror Suspects from U.S. Abuse, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2005, at A04.
58 Andrew A. Moher, Note and Comment, The Lesser of Two Evils? An Argument for Judicially
Sanctioned Torture in a Post-9/JJ World, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 469, 479-80 (2004).
59 Dana Priest, Long-Term Plan Sought for Terror Suspects, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 2005, at A01.
60 Id.
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2001 to make certain detainees neither go to court nor go back to the
streets.6' In contrast to Guantanamo Bay, where military lawyers, news
reporters, and the Red Cross have access to monitor the conditions of the
prison and the treatment of prisoners, the CIA's overseas interrogation
facilities are "off-limits" to outsiders.62 The CIA, finding itself "[f]ree from
the scrutiny of military lawyers steeped in the international laws of war....
[has] the leeway to exert physically and psychologically aggressive
techniques..., 63 The policy of rendition by definition creates situations in
which interrogators are prone to view torture as part of the interrogation
process.
One vivid example of the danger of this policy is the case of Maher
Arar, a Canadian citizen rendered to Syria. On September 26, 2002, Arar
was detained at JFK airport while in transit to Canada and held in U.S.
custody for thirteen days while he was questioned about his alleged links
with A1-Qaeda.64 After being deported to Syria without any hearing and
without his family, lawyer, or the Canadian consulate being informed, Arar
was taken to the Palestine branch of Syrian military intelligence known for
the routine torture of political prisoners.65  The Syrian military officers
severely beat him with electrical cables during six days of interrogation and
threatened him with electric shocks and the "metal chair," a torture device
that stretches the spine.66 Consequently, Arar falsely confessed to having
trained in Afghanistan with al-Qaeda and was held in a tiny basement cell
without light for more than ten months.67 The U.S. finally returned him to
Canada after determining that he was not a member of al-Qaeda.68 Arar later
sued the United States for this action, but the United States District Court
judge in Brooklyn dismissed the case, holding that the court did not have the
authority to review the actions because they involved national security and
foreign relations.69 Arar's lawyer said that the ruling set "a frightening
precedent" by suggesting that the courts were unable to prevent torture.
70
Arar also testified in Brussels before a European Parliament committee
61 Id.
62 See Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations: "Stress
and Duress" Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities, WASH. POST, Dec.
26, 2002, at AOL (describing the rendition process in countries known for human rights violations, such as
Afghanistan, Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco).
63 Id.
64 Press Release, Amnesty International, USA: Deporting for Torture? (Nov. 14, 2003), available





6 Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
70 Scott Shane, U.S. Judge Dismisses Suit by Canadian Deported to Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17,
2006, at A10.
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investigating allegations that the CIA has used European airports for the
outsourcing of torture:
I am testifying so the world will know that the U.S.
government abducted me for no reason in New York and sent
me to Syria, where I was tortured and the U.S. government
knew this was a common practice. The Bush administration
does not dispute that I was held without ever being charged
or tried with any crime. I still believe that when people
realize they are living in countries that advance the
detainment and torture of innocent people, they will rise up
and demand change.7'
One of the U.S. State Department's human rights reports cites "credible
evidence that security forces [in Syria] continue to use torture," and President
Bush called Syria a country with a "legacy of torture" in his major address on
the Middle East on November 6, 2003.72
One major problem with the policy of rendition is the lack of
accountability for countries that employ it. By sending away terrorism
suspects to countries where torture is commonplace, the United States enjoys
the fruits of information gained from the interrogations, presumably by the
use of torture. The United States "can gain valuable information with
impunity, while claiming that [it] [has] 'no direct knowledge' of the host
country's interrogation methods. '7 3 Furthermore, rendition is a dangerous
interrogation policy because it places detainees in situations where torture is
viewed as a desirable and effective method. Interrogation methods of the
receiving countries are "often ghastly in nature. 74  Therefore, the
consequence of rendition is "the manipulation of the international law
system, as well as the circumnavigation of domestic law prohibitions against
torture."
75
71 Testimony of Torture: Maher Arar Speaks to the European Parliament, Amnesty International
USA (Mar. 23, 2006), available at http://blogs.amnestyusa.org/denounce-torturelarchive/2006/03/23/
n4kheqauzh3y.htm.
Deporting for Torture, supra note 64.
73 Moher, supra note 58, at 480.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 481.
13 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & Soc. JUST. 1 (2006)
III. Narrowing the Definition of Torture
The memorandum from Jay S. Bybee to Alberto R. Gonzales written
on August 1, 2002 (Bybee Memo) 76 demonstrates the U.S. government's
narrow understanding of torture, which possibly contributed to the problems
of Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, and the policy of rendition. Even though a
later memorandum superseded the Bybee Memo, many incidents of abuse
and torture occurred between the issuance of the two memoranda, suggesting
that the Bybee Memo contributed to the creation of an environment
permissive of torture. The Bybee Memo interprets the Convention Against
Torture, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, and the Torture Victims Protection Act.
The interpretation of these three legal documents as prohibiting only extreme
acts may have led to severe violations of human rights against torture.
A. The Convention Against Torture
On December 10, 1984, the United Nations General Assembly
defined the term "torture" by adopting the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), which
entered into force on June 26, 1987. 77 The first draft of the CAT defined
torture as an "aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. 7 8  Although later versions removed this
hierarchical relationship between torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment, the concept remains in Article 16, which states that
each party should "undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction
other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do
not amount to torture. . .. ,,9 It is clear that "the use of ill treatment is no
more condoned under international law than torture. Just as a square is also a
rectangle, torture is also ill treatment. Both are illegal and prohibited under
international law.,
80
76 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18
U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002) available at http://www.washingtonpost.comwp-
srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801 .pdf [hereinafter Bybee Memo].
77 United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
79 Draft International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 1, submitted by Sweden, U.N. Doc. No. E/CN.4/1285 (1978).
79 Id. at art. 16(1).
so Louis-Philippe F. Rouillard, Misinterpreting the Prohibition of Torture Under International
Law: The Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 9, 22 (2005); see infra Part
Il(C) (describing the ratified U.S. definition).
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The definition of torture in the CAT, which the U.S. accepted with
some reservations and understandings, is the following:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information
or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person
has committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain
or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions.81
This definition comprises seven main elements: (1) an act; (2) severe pain or
suffering; (3) physical or mental pain; (4) intent; (5) particular purposes; (6)
involvement of a public official; and (7) the absence of pain or suffering
from lawful sanctions.8 2
First, torture must be an "act" that causes severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental.8 3 It is important to note that an act includes both
pro-active behavior and omissions, since excluding omissions would run
contrary to the purpose of the CAT. 4 The object and purpose of the CAT
are "the regulation and prohibition of all governmental conduct that inflicts
pain or suffering for the ends stated in Article 1, regardless of whether such
conduct is affirmative or negative. . . .Negative acts may inflict as much
physical and mental harm as positive acts and achieve the same inhuman
ends."8 5 For example, the failure to provide a prisoner with food or water for
several days would cause severe pain or suffering even if the "act" may
technically be an omission. 6
Secondly, an act of torture must constitute "severe pain or
suffering., 87 The CAT places torture "at the extreme end of a spectrum of
pain-inducing acts., 8 8  The distinction between torture and other cruel,
81 CAT, supra note 77, at art. 1.
82 GAIL H. MILLER, DEFINING TORTURE 6 (2005).
83 CAT, supra note 77, at art. 1.
84 MILLER, supra note 82, at 7.
85 AHCENE BOULESBAA, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON TORTURE AND THE PROSPECTS FOR
ENFORCEMENT 51 (1999).
96 MILLER, supra note 82, at 7.
87 CAT, supra note 77, at art. 1.
9 MILLER, supra note 82, at 8.
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inhuman, or degrading acts articulated in Article 16 of the CAT elevates the
severity of pain or suffering caused by torture over less severe acts.
Furthermore, the impact of the severe pain or suffering on a particular victim
is relevant in cases where severity of the pain is at issue.89 This subjective
standard takes into account the reality that the same act could have different
effects on different people "depending on -their natural susceptibility and
threshold for pain.,90
The third element of the CAT's definition is that pain or suffering
must be either physical or mental in order for an act to be torture. 91 Although
the CAT does not describe what constitutes physical or mental pain, the CAT
acknowledges that there is a difference between the two types of pain or
suffering by naming both physical and mental.92 Furthermore, by using the
conjunction "or" instead of "and," the definition implies that mental pain or
suffering alone can constitute torture and that physically visible pain is not
required in all situations of alleged torture.
Fourthly, severe pain or suffering must be "intentionally inflicted"
on a person.93 This intent requirement emphasizes the torturer's state of
mind and allows instances where an act causing the same amount of severe
pain or suffering may be excused due to lack of intent. For example, the
definition does not cover a prisoner experiencing severe pain or suffering as
a result of poor prison conditions if the officials did not intend the conditions
to affect the prisoner severely.94 Moreover, the actor must intend to "inflict"
severe pain or suffering, which implies that the actor must intend both to act
and to cause a particular harm.95 This requirement of intent substantially
narrows the definition of torture by excluding incidents in which the alleged
victim cannot prove the actor's state of mind due to several difficulties, such
as inability to acquire evidence of intent.
The CAT definition of torture also includes a list of purposes for
which the torturer must have performed the act. It is significant that the
definition lists certain kinds of purposes. The reference of purposes would
be meaningless if any purpose can be the basis for torture. However, the
phrase "such purposes as" suggests that the list is non-exhaustive.97 The
definition does not use the phrase "or for any other purposes" which
indicates that relevant purposes not listed must have something in common
89 Id. at 10.
90 Id.
91 CAT, supra note 77, at art. 1.
92 MILLER, supra note 82, at 12.
93 CAT, supra note 77, at art. 1.
94 MILLER, supra note 82, at 13.
95 Id. at 14.
96 Id. at 15.
97 CAT, supra note 77, at art. 1.
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98with those listed in the definition. The torturous act "must be performed
for a separate purpose and cannot be an end in itself."99
Moreover, the CAT definition of torture requires state involvement;
the act must be "inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity."'0° The definition does not cover private torture because national
criminal laws generally sanction private torture.' 0' However, any level of
state involvement can constitute torture as long as a public official consents
to, acquiesces in, or instigates private acts. 10 2 Therefore, "state inaction in
the face of private violence can constitute torture."'
10 3
Lastly, pain or suffering from lawful sanctions does not constitute
torture under the CAT. 104 This lawful sanctions exception may be "the result
of political compromises intended to allow particular forms of punishment,
such as the death penalty, without undermining the core principles of the
CAT."'0 5 For instance, in its understandings of the CAT, the United States
articulated that it "understands that international law does not prohibit the
death penalty and does not consider this Convention to restrict or prohibit the
United States from applying the death penalty." 106  Nonetheless, this
exception can swallow the rule by allowing a state to call an act a lawful
sanction in order to avoid the prohibition on torture. 10 7  Additionally, this
exception creates a lack of universality by allowing states to carve out
exceptions based on national law.108  Although allowing severe pain or
suffering under lawful sanctions gives the states flexibility, the potential
abuse of this exception can undermine the very purpose of eliminating
torture.
9s See MILLER, supra note 82, at 16 (stating that some conclude that the common element is "a
relation between the purpose and state interests or policies").
99 Id.
100 CAT, supra note 77, at art. 1.
101 MILLER, supra note 82, at 17.
102 id. at 18.
103 Id.
to4 CAT, supra note 77, at art. 1.
105 MILLER, supra note 82 at 21.
106 United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Reservations, Understandings and Declarations Made by the United States of
America, 11(4), available at http://ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/9.htm (last visited Nov. 18,
2006) [hereinafter CAT Reservations, Understandings and Declarations].
107 See MILLER, supra note 82, at 20 (stating that "as to date, no country has defended against
charges of torture on the grounds that the actions were incidental to lawful sanctions").
108 See id. at 21 (indicating that some states have attempted to solve this ambiguity by eliminating
or clarifying the exception in their own torture definitions).
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B. The United States' Reservations and Understandings of the CAT
In interpreting the CAT definition of torture, the United States made
a reservation to indicate that it considers itself bound by the obligation under
Article 16 to prevent "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"
only insofar as the term means "cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or
punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments
to the Constitution of the United States.""°9 This reservation narrows the
application of the CAT by allowing instances of cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment that are not prohibited by the U.S. laws of due process and cruel
and unusual punishment. The reservation also raises the possibility that the
U.S. might have had a narrower understanding of torture than that found
under international law as early as the 1990s. If this were the case,
deviations in the Bybee Memo from the CAT definition need not be viewed
as new interpretations, even though the public perceived them to be based on
the narrow interpretation of "torture" in the Memo.
Unlike the definition in the CAT, a formal U.S. understanding
includes the terms "specifically intended" in order to add the specific intent
requirement to the definition."0 The drafters of the understanding were
concerned that the CAT definition requires only general intent as opposed to
specific intent."' As a condition for ratifying the CAT, the U.S. also
submitted an understanding which listed the sources of the mental pain or
suffering:
Mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm
caused by or resulting from (1) the intentional infliction or
threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; (2)
the administration or application, or threatened
administration or application, of mind altering substances or
other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses
or the personality; (3) the threat of imminent death; or (4) the
threat that another person will imminently subjected to death,
severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or
application of mind altering substances or other procedures
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses of personality." 
2
109 CAT Reservations, Understandings and Declarations, supra note 106, at I(1).
110 Id. at H(l)(a).
I See MiLLER, supra note 82, at 14 (distinguishing between general intent and specific intent:
"General intent is a less demanding standard, requiring merely that the actor intended to perform the
conduct as opposed to intending to create a particular result in violation of the law. Specific intent
requires acting with the intent to achieve a result or intending to commit a particular crime.").
112 CAT Reservations, Understandings and Declarations, supra note 106, at n(l)(a).
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This enumeration of sources of the mental harm narrows the definition by
excluding other sources that may clearly qualify for causing severe mental
harm. Confining mental harm to a list of enumerated actions thus narrows
the definition.' 13 Moreover, the addition of the word "prolonged" eliminates
instant or brief mental harm caused by the listed sources. The definition also
gives no "guidance [for] differentiating between transient mental harm and
prolonged mental harm." 114
The U.S. also presented a different approach to the "public official"
requirement. While including a concept of custody, or physical control, the
U.S. understanding also added the new term "offender. ' 1-5 If the government
is defined as the offender, the additional requirement that the offender must
have custody or physical control of the victim may require a closer nexus
between the public official and the victim. 116 Consequently, this requirement
also narrows the CAT definition by adding another burden of proof for the
alleged victim to prove.
Finally, the U.S. stated its view that the Convention does not prohibit
the death penalty. 1 7  This leaves open the possibility that the U.S. may
impose the death penalty on terrorism suspects, because the definition of
torture in the CAT permits pain or suffering arising from lawful sanctions.
The lawful sanctions provision precludes arguments that the death penalty
constitutes torture and thus narrows the U.S. definition of torture even
further.
C. Ratification of the CAT
On November 20, 1994, the United States ratified the CAT into 18
U.S.C. § 2340 pursuant to Article 2 of the CAT, which requires each country
to establish its own national legislation to prevent torture.'18 In this process
of establishing national legislation, many signatories "have tinkered with the
CAT's definition of torture, redefining the term through slight alteration.
Consequently, implementation of the CAT has resulted in the emergence of
numerous definitions of torture, rather than a unitary, uniform definition. ' 19
13 See MILLER, supra note 82, at 12.
14 See id. at 12 ("Must the harm be constant and enduring, or might periodic yet debilitating
flashbacks suffice?").
1"5 See CAT Reservations, Understandings and Declarations, supra note 106, at 11(l)(b) ("The
definition of torture in Article I is intended to apply only to acts directed against persons in the offender's
custody or physical control.").
116 MILLER, supra note 82, at 19.
17 CAT Reservations, Understandings and Declarations, supra note 106, at 11(4).
119 See CAT, supra note 77, at art. 2 § 1 ("Each State Party shall take effective legislative,
administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its
jurisdiction.").
19 MILLER, supra note 82, at 6.
13 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 1 (2006)
The United States is one of the parties that made changes to the definition of
torture when it ratified the treaty into its national law.
The U.S. legislation ratifying the CAT defines torture as "an act
committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to
inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or
suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his
custody or physical control."'120 This definition makes major changes to the
definition of torture in the CAT. First, the U.S. definition keeps the U.S.
understanding's addition of the term "specific" restricted to the intent
requirement. 2 1  By requiring specific intent, the definition legalizes
instances of a torturous act in which the actor only had general intent.
Furthermore, proving specific intent can be a more challenging requirement
than showing general intent.
22
The second major change to the CAT definition is that the U.S.
statute defines mental pain or suffering by keeping the list of sources for
mental harm found in the U.S. understanding. 23 The U.S. definition also
replaces the public official language with a new phrase: "upon another
person within his custody or physical control."'12 4  Whereas the CAT
definition allows any state involvement to constitute torture, the U.S.
definition seems to limit the public official requirement to situations where
the person "acting under the color of law" inflicts harm upon the victim only
when the victim is within the actor's custody or physical control. 125 It is
interesting to note that the U.S. ratification does not keep the phrase "in the
offender's custody or physical control" from the U.S. understanding. Lastly,
18 U.S.C. § 2340 eliminates the illustrative list of purposes included in the
CAT. This elimination potentially "broadens the reach of § 2340 to torturous
acts the purpose of which is unknown or unconnected to the CAT's list."'
126
D. The Torture Victim Protection Act
The Bybee Memo also analyzed the Torture Victim Protection Act
(TVPA), and reached the same conclusion that torture only prohibits heinous
12D 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (1994).
121 id.
122 See infra Part III(E)(1)(d) (comparing the specific intent element in the U.S. ratified definition
with the change of definition in the Bybee Memo).
23 See 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2); see also supra Part 111(B) (discussing the list of sources of mental
harm in detail).
124 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1).
125 Id.
126 MILLER, supra note 82, at 26.
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acts. 127 Congress adopted the TVPA in response to the concerns prompted
by a narrow construction of the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA),'28 which had
created jurisdictional difficulties for foreign human rights victims. 2 9 The
ATCA gives the district court jurisdiction to hear civil actions brought by
aliens for torts committed in violation of the law of nations.' 30  Unlike the
ATCA, the TVPA provides alien and American victims of official torture
and extrajudicial killing with a private right of action in American courts.' 3'
The TVPA provides that "[a]n individual who, under actual or apparent
authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation ... subjects an individual to
torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual."'132
The TVPA definition of torture is essentially the 18 U.S.C. § 2340
definition without the "specifically intended" language, and including the
CAT's purpose requirement. 133  The TVPA's definition of torture is the
following:
The term "torture" means any act, directed against an
individual in the offender's custody or physical control, by
which severe pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering
arising only from or inherent in, or incidental to, lawful
sanctions), whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on that individual for such purposes as obtaining
from that individual or a third person information or a
confession, punishing that individual for an act that
individual or a third person has committed or is suspected of
having committed, intimidating or coercing that individual or
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of
any kind.134
Unlike 18 U.S.C. § 2340 and the CAT, the TVPA includes the word
"offender" found in the U.S. understanding. The TVPA also includes the list
of sources for mental pain or suffering as included in § 2340.15 However,
127 See Bybee Memo, supra note 76, at 2 (stating that cases involving the Torture Victim
Protection Act demonstrate that "most often torture involves cruel and extreme physical pain").
128 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2003).
129 Jennifer Correale, The Torture Victim Protection Act: A Vital Contribution to International
Human Rights Enforcement or Just a Nice Gesture?, 6 PACE INT'L L. REV. 197, 198 (1994).
130 See Alien Tort Claims Act § 1350 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.").
131 Correale, supra note 129, at 198-99.
132 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992), codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1350 note.
133 MILLER, supra note 82, at 29-30.
13 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991.
135 Id.
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the TVPA uses the phrase "arising only from or inherent in, or incidental to,
lawful sanctions," instead of "incidental to lawful sanctions," as in § 2340.
Cases applying the TVPA have not provided in-depth discussion of what
constitutes torture because most cases dealt with abuse in the extreme. 1
36
E. The Bush Administration's Definition of Torture
1. The Bybee Memo
a. Comparison with the Text of the CAT
In the Bybee Memo, the OLC interpreted the CAT's definition of
torture very narrowly. First, the OLC concluded that the text of the CAT
prohibits only the most extreme acts by reserving criminal penalties solely
for torture and declining to require such penalties for "cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment."'137  Consequently, torture is "at the
farthest end of impermissible actions, and.., it is distinct and separate from
the lower level of 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. ," 
38
This narrow reading allows torturous acts to fall under the category of cruel,
inhuman or degrading punishment so that the government can avoid criminal
penalties.
In addition, the OLC noted that the text of the CAT requires the pain
and suffering to be "severe" to reach the threshold of torture and that torture
must be an extreme act. 139  In reaching this conclusion, the OLC
acknowledged that the text of the treaty requires that an individual act
"intentionally" but offered a different interpretation: "This language might be
read to require only general intent for violations of the Torture Convention.
We believe, however, that the better interpretation is that the use of the
phrase 'intentionally' also created a specific intent-type standard."' 140 The
OLC offered a narrower interpretation of torture by understanding the text of
the CAT to require specific intent even though the word "specific" was never
used.
141
The OLC also emphasized that the list of purposes in the CAT's
definition was illustrative rather than exhaustive. 142 The OLC justified the
exclusion of the list of purposes in 18 U.S.C. § 2340 by reasoning that "a
136 MILLER, supra note 82, at 30.
137 Bybee Memo, supra note 76, at 1-2.
138 Id. at 15.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 15 n.7.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 14.
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purpose of the same kind" can satisfy the purpose requirement of the
definition. 143 This omission of the list enables the government to perform
torturous acts for purposes that could violate the definition of torture,
because it would be difficult for the alleged victim to prove the purpose
without a set of purposes with which he or she can compare the perpetrator's
act.
b. Comparison with U.S. Reservations to the CAT
The OLC's interpretation of torture as being at the extreme end of
impermissible actions is even narrower than the U.S. reservations to the
CAT.144 The OLC's view of the text of the CAT to require specific intent is
consistent with the U.S. understanding. 45 However, the OLC interprets the
Article 16 of the CAT more narrowly than the drafters of the reservations.
146
Although the reservations limit the definition of "cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment" to the meaning found in the Fifth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the reservations make it clear that "the
United States considers itself bound by the obligation under article 16."0
4 7
This means that the U.S. will undertake to prevent other acts of cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment, even if they do not amount to torture. 148 By
only focusing on the parts "which do not amount to torture," the OLC tries to
lower the government's obligation to prevent torturous acts, whether or not
they are placed at the farthest end of extreme acts.
49
c. Comparison with Executive Interpretations of the CAT
The OLC looked at the executive branch interpretations of the treaty
and concluded that the treaty was intended to reach only the most extreme
acts. 150  The Reagan administration recommended the following
understanding: "The United States understands that, in order to constitute
torture, an act must be a deliberate and calculated act of an extremely cruel
and inhuman nature, specifically intended to inflict excruciating and
143 Id.
144 CAT Reservations, Understandings and Declarations, supra note 106, at ll(l)(a).
145 Id.
:46 Bybee Memo, supra note 76, at 15.
47 CAT Reservations, Understandings and Declarations, supra note 106, at 1(1).
149 Id.
149 Bybee Memo, supra note 76, at 15.
' Id. at 2.
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agonizing physical or mental pain or suffering."'' 51  The Reagan
administration viewed torture to include "extreme, deliberate and unusually
cruel practices, for example, sustained systematic beating, application of
electric currents to sensitive parts of the body, and tying up or hanging in
positions that cause extreme pain."'152 This list of examples suggests that the
Bybee Memo demonstrates an even narrower understanding of torture than
the Reagan administration because the latter did not mention such extreme
examples as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or death. 53
According to the OLC, the Reagan administration took a narrow approach
because it described torture to be an extreme form of cruel and inhuman
treatment.5154 The Reagan administration acknowledged that torture is to be
distinguished from lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and
punishment, which "are to be deplored and prevented, but not so universally
and categorically condemned."'' I 5 However, it is questionable whether the
administration viewed the scope of cruel, inhuman or degrading acts so
narrowly that it could only include such extreme practices as organ failure,
impairment of bodily function, or death. 1
56
The OLC also mentioned that the Bush administration joined the
Reagan administration in interpreting torture as only reaching extreme
acts. 157  For instance, at the Senate hearing on the CAT, Mark Richard,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Department of Justice's Criminal
Division, stated that under the Bush administration's submissions with the
treaty, the essence of torture was excruciating and agonizing pain.
1 58
According to the OLC, the Bush administration had the same purpose as the
Reagan administration in terms of ensuring that the prohibition against
torture reaches only the most extreme acts. 159 The OLC also examined the
negotiating history of states in crafting the definition of torture.16° The OLC
emphasized that the state parties rejected a proposal that would have defined
torture merely as cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.'
16
Therefore, the OLC' s view of the executive interpretations as limiting torture
151 President's Message to Senate Transmitting the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1988 U.S.T. LEXIS 202, 18
(Apr. 18, 1998) [hereinafter President's Message).
152 Id. at 16.
153 Bybee Memo, supra note 76, at 1.
154 Id. at 17.
155 President's Message, supra note 15 1, at 13.
156 Id. at 14.
157 Bybee Memo, supra note 76, at 18.
158 Id. at 19-20.
159 Id. at 19.
16o Id. at 20.
161 Id. at 21.
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to the most heinous acts permits the government to perform allegedly
torturous acts without the legal prohibition of torture.'62
d. Comparison with 18 U.S.C. § 2340
The Bybee Memo also adopted an extremely narrow definition of
torture under 18 U.S.C. § 2340.'63 The OLC concluded that the statute
prohibits only extreme acts:
We conclude that for an act to constitute torture as defined in
Section 2340, it must inflict pain that is difficult to endure.
Physical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in
intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury,
such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even
death. For purely mental pain or suffering to amount to
torture under Section 2340, it must result in significant
psychological harm of significant duration, e.g., lasting for
months or even years.1
64
After examining different definitions from dictionaries, the OLC noted that
the adjective "severe" means that the pain or suffering must be "of such a
high level of intensity that the pain is difficult for the subject to endure."'
' 65
The OLC also looked at statutes defining an emergency medical condition
and stated that the statutes treat severe pain "as an indicator of ailments that
are likely to result in permanent and serious physical damage in the absence
of immediate medical treatment."' 66 For mental pain, the acts must "cause
some lasting, though not necessarily permanent, damage."' 67 According to
the OLC, the mental harm from a lengthy and intense police interrogation
does not violate § 2340(2), but post-traumatic stress disorder or chronic
depression might satisfy the prolonged harm requirement. 16 The OLC also
stated that specific intent must be present with respect to prolonged mental
harm, thereby creating even a higher standard of meeting the intent
requirement. 69
Another narrow interpretation of the statute by the OLC is its
understanding of the specific intent requirement. Knowledge alone that a
162 Id. at 22.
163 Id. at 1.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 5.
166 Id. at 6.
167 Id. at 7.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 8.
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particular result is going to occur does not satisfy specific intent."'
Therefore, a person is guilty of torture "only if he acts with the express
purpose of inflicting severe pain or suffering on a person within his custody
or physical control."'17' Although the OLC maintains that specific intent is
required, it fails to define specific intent in this context. 72  It is also
questionable whether a precise definition of "express purpose" is possible,
and if so, whether torturers expressly indicate their intention to inflict harm
on others as their main objective.
1 73
The Bybee Memo received overwhelming criticism from the legal
community, mainly because its definition including organ failure,
impairment of bodily function, or even death derives from a statutory
framework that has nothing to do with torture. 174  Experts in criminal,
international, constitutional, and military law argued that the legal analysis
was so faulty that the lawyers' advice was incompetent. 75  State
Departments, military Judge Advocate General lawyers, and many others
have attacked the Memo as "legally and morally unsupportable, likely to
endanger our own military personnel, and damaging to our country's
reputation and national interest." 176 Professor W. Bradley Wendel points out
that "burning detainees with cigarettes, administering electric shocks to their
genitals, hanging them by the wrists, submerging them in water to simulate
drowning, beating them, and sexually humiliating them would not be deemed
'torture' under this definition."' 177 Although it is not clear to what extent the
Bybee Memo may have contributed to the abuses at Abu Ghraib,
Guantanamo, and other places, it has been suggested that it may at least have
"fostered a permissive climate in which such abuses were more likely."'178 It
is not surprising that such a narrow interpretation of torture might have sent a
message to the interrogators that only a few instances would actually amount
to torture.
170 Id. at 4.
171 Id.
172 MILLER, supra note 82, at 14.
173 Id. at 15-17.
174 See Bybee Memo, supra note 76, at 5 ("Significantly, the phrase 'severe pain' appears in
statutes defining an emergency medical condition for the purpose of providing health benefits.").
175 W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91 CORNELL L. REv.
67,68 (2005).
176 Richard B. Bilder & Detlev F. Vagts, Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers and Torture, 98 AM. J.
INT'L L. 689, 690 (2004).
177 Wendel, supra note 175, at 81.
178 Bilder & Vagts, supra note 176, at 691.
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e. Comparison with the TVPA
The Bybee Memo also recognized that U.S. courts have not analyzed
in detail the definition of torture in their application of the TVPA, due to the
nature of the acts alleged in past TVPA cases. 179 However, the OLC stated
that there are certain kinds of acts that consistently reappear in the cases and
that a court would find such acts tantamount to torture. 80  The OLC
interpreted the totality-of-the-circumstances approach of the TVPA cases as
the courts' tendency to construe the nature of torture to be extreme: "The
adoption of such an approach suggests that torture generally is of such an
extreme nature-namely, the nature of acts are [sic] so shocking and
obviously incredibly painful-that courts will more likely examine the
totality of the circumstances, rather than engage in a careful parsing of the
statute."'18 1 Although it is true that the TVPA cases do not offer a thorough
analysis of the definition of torture, it is not clear whether courts do so
because they view the nature of torture to be so extreme as to produce organ
failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death. 82 In fact, the OLC
"labors to distinguish cases tending to show that severe pain can result from
acts that do not necessarily threaten permanent organ failure or
dysfunction."'' 83 This analysis again demonstrates the government's attempt
to redefine the scope of torture so that the government can have freedom to
employ torturous acts.
2. The Levin Memo
On December 30, 2004, Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney
General in the Office of Legal Counsel, submitted a new memorandum to
James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General (Levin Memo), 84 that
179 Bybee Memo, supra note 76, at 24.
1'0 See id. (listing seven major kinds of acts that are likely to constitute torture: "(1) severe
beatings using instruments such as iron bars, truncheons, and clubs; (2) threats of imminent death, such as
mock executions; (3) threats of removing extremities; (4) burning, especially burning with cigarettes; (5)
electric shocks to genitalia or threats to do so; (6) rape or sexual assault, or injury to an individual's sexual
organs, or threatening to do any of these sorts of acts; and (7) forcing the prisoner to watch the torture of
others").
181 Id. at 27.
182 See Bybee Memo, supra note 76, at 5 (defining torture to include organ failure, impairment of
bodily function, or even death).
183 Wendel, supra note 175, at 82.
184 Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel,
to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, Re: Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§
2340-2340A (Dec. 30, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf [hereinafter Levin
Memo].
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superseded the Bybee Memo in its entirety. 85  Even though this new
memorandum followed the Bybee Memo, a permissive environment had
already been created by the Bybee Memo. The Levin Memo omitted the old
narrow definition of torture as pain being "equivalent in intensity to the pain
accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of
bodily function, or even death.' 86 The Levin Memo also disagrees with the
previous memorandum in that the OLC no longer believes that Congress
intended to reach only conduct involving "excruciating and agonizing" pain
or suffering. 187 The Levin Memo describes the severe pain as falling below
the level of excruciating pain, but above the level of pain from cruel and
inhuman treatment.
188
Furthermore, the Levin Memo concludes that the inclusion of the
words "or suffering" in "severe physical pain or suffering" establishes that
physical torture is not limited to "severe physical pain."'189 The OLC also
interpreted the phrase "the prolonged mental harm" to mean that the harm
has "some lasting duration" instead of narrowly requiring months or years as
in the Bybee Memo. 19° Lastly, the Levin Memo acknowledges that the
meaning of "specific intent" is ambiguous but does not offer a definition.
Instead, it dismisses the usefulness of defining the meaning of the words by
stating that "in light of the President's directive that the United States not
engage in torture, it would not be appropriate to rely on parsing the specific
intent element of the statute to approve as lawful conduct that might
otherwise amount to torture." 191
Although the new memorandum moves away from the extremely
narrow interpretation of torture offered in the Bybee Memo, the Levin Memo
does not provide more guidance in defining what each element of the
definition means so that interrogators of terrorism suspects can comply with
a clearly defined law. For instance, a couple of weeks before the publication
of the Levin Memo in December 2004, a Justice Department lawyer
informed a CSRT that "it would not be illegal to torture detainees to obtain
statements about them."'192 Whether the Levin Memo has had any impact on
broadening the narrow interpretation of torture from the Bybee Memo is still
not clear.
185 Id. at 2.
186 Id. (quoting Bybee Memo, supra note 76, at 1).
187 Id. at 8.
188 MILLER, supra note 82, at 27.
189 Levin Memo, supra note 184, at 11.
190 Id. at 14.
191 Id. at 16-17.
192 Leonnig & Tate, supra note 34.
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3. The McCain Amendment
On December 30, 2005, President Bush signed into law the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005, commonly referred to as the "McCain
Amendment."' 93 The Amendment provides that "no person in the custody or
under the effective control of the Department of Defense or under detention
in a Department of Defense facility shall be subject to any treatment or
technique of interrogation not authorized by and listed in the United States
Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation."' 94  Senator McCain
proposed the Army Field Manual to be the guidepost for interrogations of
detainees:
The advantage of setting a standard for interrogation based
on the Field Manual is to cut down on the significant level of
confusion that still exists with respect to which interrogation
techniques are allowed .... [D]istinguished officers believe
that the abuses at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo and elsewhere
took place in part because our soldiers received ambiguous
instructions, which in some cases authorized treatment that
went beyond what the Field Manual allows.1
95
Limiting interrogations to treatment or techniques authorized by the Army
Field Manual may provide better guidance to the interrogators. 96 However,
critics argue that the Army Field Manual is always subject to revision and
therefore to changes in the definition of authorized techniques.
97
In addition, the McCain Amendment does not define or even include
the word "torture" but merely uses the existing definition of "cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment or punishment," that is, "the cruel, unusual, and
inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States."'
198
Therefore, the Amendment fails to offer a precise definition of torture and to
describe how torture is distinguishable from other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment. 99 Although the McCain Amendment provides the
basis for uniform and clear instructions on interrogations, the definition of
torture in the Army Field Manual must be more precise and clear.
193 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001-1006 (2005).
194 Id. at § 1002 (a).
195 John McCain, U.S. Senator, Statement of Amendment on Army Field Manual (Jul. 25, 2005),
available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/05117-etn-mccain-stat-detain-amdts-auth.pdf.
196 MILLER, supra note 82, at Addendum.
197 Id.
198 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1003(d) (2005).
199 MILLER, supra note 82, at Addendum.
13 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & Soc. JUST. 1 (2006)
IV. The Effects of Narrowing the Definition of Torture
A. Causal Connection between the Narrowed Definition and the Occurrence
of Torture
The narrowed definition of torture in the Bybee Memo contributed to
the human rights abuses evident in Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, and
facilitated the rendering of detainees to other jurisdictions that interrogate
abusively. Although the Levin Memo superseded the Bybee Memo, the
effects of the Bybee Memo are significant in that the occurrence of torture
happened in between the two memos. For example, Colonel Thomas M.
Pappas, the top U.S. military intelligence officer at the Abu Ghraib prison,
testified in a trial of a military police dog handler that he inappropriately
approved the use of dogs for interrogations without consulting higher-
ranking officers. 2° Pappas said that a series of interrogation memos from
Baghdad that listed dogs as an option led him to believe he did not need to
seek approval from Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, then the top
general in Iraq in 2003.201 The dispute in the case was whether the actions
were the work of a few bad soldiers or whether they were part of a system of
aggressive tactics sanctioned by the highest levels of government.2 °2 Pappas
told the jurors that he "proceeded without clearance in telling one of his
interrogators he could bring dogs into an interrogation booth to scare a
detainee. ''20 3 Sergeant Michael J. Smith, the military police dog handler in
this case, was found guilty of tormenting detainees with his snarling Belgian
shepherd for his own amusement.2 °4
The fact that top officials ordered interrogators to use dogs without
explaining the rules to the military police dog handlers shows that there is
lack of concern for whether such an act constitutes torture. The government
cannot dismiss this problem by pointing fingers at a few individuals. For
instance, Sergeant Smith said he was merely following interrogation
procedures approved by the chief intelligence officer at Abu Ghraib, Colonel
Pappas, who in turn said he had been following guidance from Major
General Geoffrey D. Miller.20 5 This chain of responsibilities indicates that
200 See Josh White, Officer Says He Wrongly Approved Use of Dogs, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2006,
at A01 (describing the testimony of Colonel Thomas M. Pappas, who testified at the trial of a military




204 Eric Schmitt, Army Dog Handler Is Convicted in Detainee Abuse at Abu Ghraib, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 21, 2006, at Al.
205 See Eric Schmitt, Iraqi Abuse Trial Is Again Limited to Lower Ranks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
2006, at Al; see also Josh White, Top Officer Ordered to Testify on Abuse: Use of Dogs to Scare
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there is an organized and systematic problem coming from policies written
by top officials in the administration. 206 The Bush administration "decided to
go outside the law to deal with prisoners, and soldiers carried out that policy.
Those who committed these atrocities deserve the punishment they are
getting, but virtually all high-ranking soldiers have escaped unscathed.,
20 7
Narrowing the definition of torture to extreme acts may have created
confusion and lack of communications between officials to discuss what
would constitute torture.
B. Security Interests versus Respect for the Law
Violating human rights by narrowing the definition of torture leads
to undesirable results and poor policymaking decisions. In the war on
terrorism, the use of abuse and torture has been "sanitized under the guise of
interrogation and intelligence-gathering. Rendering an individual for
interrogation or holding someone for intelligence-gathering has bleached the
more sinister reality of indefinite detention and infliction of aggressive use of
violence (psychological and physical). 2 °s  Moreover, the information
gathered from interrogations involving abuse and torture may not always be
reliable or accurate.2°
Furthermore, disrespecting law in the name of national security
interests may cause damage to the country's image as well as a lack of
respect and support from other countries. Professor Mark Drumbl believes
that disregarding law in one context may have spillover effects in other
contexts:
Once governments go down the road of slicing away rule of
law by bending the rules on torture, they may hungrily
continue to slice, and ordinary individuals may internalize
this hunger from above. In the end, one might soon end up in
a stygian place, and perhaps have gotten there quite
quickly.
210
Detainees at Issue, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2006, at A14 (stating that a military judge in Washington
ordered prosecutors to produce Army Major General Geoffrey Miller as a defense witness in the trial of
another military dog handler).
206 Editorial, The Joy of Being Blameless, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2006, at A24.
2w id.
208 Drumbl, supra note 6, at 347.
209 See id. (asking "[W]hat value really can be had from the Guantanamo and Afghan detainees:
incarcerated, isolated... has any information they might ever have had not become stale?").
210 Drumbl, supra note 6, at 346-47.
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Not only will this phenomenon cause the United States to lose respect for
law in times of fear, but it will also create the image of the United States as a
human rights violator. Because the war on terrorism is fought on the
international level, U.S. national security depends on "multilateral
cooperation and the willingness of other nations to conform their conduct to
the requirements of international law. '21' Philosopher Michael Ignatieff
argues that Abu Ghraib and other catastrophes of occupation have cost
America to lose the power to shape Iraq for the better.212
This disregard of law also gives tremendous propaganda to the
enemies. In fact, "abuses at Abu Ghraib have increased the risk that a greater
number of previously unmotivated individuals now feel motivated to lead a
life of terror., 2 13 Therefore, sacrificing the legitimacy of law in the name of
national security interests sends dangerous messages both to the international
community and to the enemies of the war on terrorism.
C. Respect for Race and Culture
Racial stereotyping is one possible explanation for the abuse and
torture of terrorism suspects. After the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, a new identity category called "Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim" has
emerged.214 Stereotyping involves identifying members of this group as
terrorists, leading to racial profiling.215 According to Leti Volpp, there was
overwhelming public opposition to racial profiling before September 11
because of its inefficiency, ineffectiveness, and unfairness.216 However,
there is now public consensus that racial profiling is "a good thing, and in
fact necessary for survival., 21 7 In fact, the U.S. government has explicitly
engaged in racial profiling of its targets in the war on terror.21 8 Racial
profiling only occurs when the government believes that certain groups of
people have indistinguishable members who are potential terrorists. 219 This
view of Arab-looking people as terrorism suspects has created the image of
211 Id. at 348.
212 See Michael Ignatieff, Mirage in the Desert, WASH. POST, June 27, 2004, at 13 (criticizing
American exceptionalism, which is "the idea that America is too noble, too special, too great to actually
obey international treaties like the Torture Convention or international bodies like the Red Cross").
213 Drumbl, supra note 54, at 919.
214 Leti Volpp, Critical Race Studies: The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1576
(2002).
215 See id. ("The stereotype of the 'Arab terrorist' is not an unfamiliar one. But the ferocity with
which multiple communities have been interpellated as responsible for the events of September [11]
suggests that there are particular dimensions that have converged in this rationalization.").
216 Id.
217 Id. at 1577.
218 Id. at 1581.
219 Id. at 1584.
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the United States as disrespecting differences in race and culture by
employing such racialized methods as racial profiling.
Furthermore, thinking of the Muslim culture in political terms has
caused certain elements of the U.S. government to view the culture as
producing terrorist political figures. Professor Mahmood Mamdani believes
that culture talk has turned religious experience into a political category,
differentiating "good Muslims" from "bad Muslims" rather than terrorists
from civilians. 220 This culture talk implies that "Islam must be quarantined
and the devil must be exorcized from it by a civil war between good Muslims
and bad Muslims. ' 221 It is doubtful whether one can read people's political
behavior from their religion or culture.222
Respecting the Muslim culture requires that society not politicize
Muslims as a territorial unit from which terrorists flow. For example,
dehumanizing interrogation methods, such as sexual humiliation in Abu
Ghraib and other prisons, show disrespect for Muslim culture. Nudity "is
considered particularly shameful in Muslim culture, a violation of religious
principles."'223 Despite this, forced nudity has commonly been employed as
part of interrogation procedures at detention facilities in Abu Ghraib,
224Guantanamo Bay, and other places. At Abu Ghraib, detainees were
paraded naked past other prisoners and guards, and some were even ordered
to do jumping jacks and sing "The Star-Spangled Banner" while naked.225 A
detainee was kept naked for five days when he first arrived at Abu Ghraib
and was forced to crawl on his stomach while guards were spitting on him
and hitting him on his back, his head, and his feet.226 Disregard for racial
and cultural differences might have led the government to allow abuses that
can easily lead to torture and have facilitated foot-soldiers to commit these
degrading acts, because these perceptions dehumanized the victims fully.
Reinforcing negative stereotypes of Arabs as terrorists can also make
it easier for the abusers of terrorism suspects to forget that even they are
human beings who deserve fundamental human rights. For example, in the
investigation of the hijackings of September 11, the Department of Justice
enlisted the assistance of state and local law enforcement agencies in the
220 Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Political Perspective on Culture and
Terrorism, 104 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 766 (2002).
221 Id.
222 Id. at 768.
223 Kate Zernike & David Rohde, Forced Nudity of Iraqi Prisoners Is Seen as a Pervasive
Pattern, Not Isolated Incidents, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2004, at A14.
224 Id.
225 id.
n6 Higham & Stephens, supra note 1, at Al.
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questioning of Arabs and Muslims. 227 In times of threat to national security,
people might be "more willing to accept aggressive measures when they
target small and politically disempowered groups, specifically racial and
ethnic minorities, and foreign nationals. '" 228  Furthermore, media and film
have been feeding on existing stereotypes in American society about Arabs
and Muslims with dangerous and one-dimensional images.229 Taking the
stereotypically Arab terrorists out of the scope of human rights makes it so
much easier for interrogators to abuse terrorism suspects. However, one
should remember that racial stereotyping cannot be an excuse for allowing
torture in any circumstance.
V. Potential Solutions
Although the McCain Amendment shows an effort of the
government to prevent cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of terrorism
suspects, the U.S. must take proactive actions for eliminating the use of
torture against anyone. First, the government must move towards the
establishment of a clear definition of what constitutes torture, and this
definition must be consistent with international human rights standards. This
would require the official banning of renditions of terrorism suspects to
countries with an extensive history of using torture. The U.S. officials are
"no less culpable because the victim is being tortured at their request, rather
than by their own hands." 230 The United States should not encourage other
countries like Morocco and Egypt to use torture as a way of winning political
favor with the U.S., because other countries with high rate of human rights
violations will see this as a sign of "terrorism exception" for torture.23
More importantly, the U.S. government must give strong adherence
to international norms and values during the war on terrorism. Because
fighting terrorism involves international relations and cooperation with the
people of other countries, the government must take into account
international law when it balances national security interests with the rule of
law. Utilizing the coordinating function of international law can help the
government fight the war on terrorism more effectively. The President and
every member of the executive branch are bound by treaties and customary
227 Susan M. Akraam & Kevin R. Johnson, "Migration Regulation Goes Local: The Role of States
in U.S. Immigration Policy": Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001: The
Targeting ofArabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRV. AM. L. 295,298 (2005).
228 Id. at 300.
229 Id. at 308.
2m J. Trevor Ulbrick, Tortured Logic: The (l)legality of United States Interrogation Practices in
the War on Terror, 4 Nw. U.J. INT'L HuM. RTs. 210, 78 (2005).
231 Id.
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international law in times of relative peace and war.232 In fact, agreeing with
the McCain Amendment, President Bush said that the agreement will "make
it clear to the world that this government does not torture and that we adhere
to the international convention of torture whether it be here at home or
abroad.,233 Therefore, respecting international norms at all times will not
only prevent abuses and torture of terrorism suspects, but also lead to
increased respect from the international community in support of the war on
terrorism.
VI. Conclusion
Protecting one's nation from threats of and attacks by terrorists is a
crucial national security interest that should not be overlooked. However,
fighting a war on terrorism must embrace the rule of law rather than
redefining the law in the name of national security. As Abu Ghraib,
Guantanamo, and the policy of rendition illustrate, narrowing the definition
of torture only creates more problems than advancing against the real
enemies of the war. Even though the Levin Memo superseded the Bybee
Memo in its entirety, its interpretations of the CAT, 18 U.S.C. § 2340, and
TVPA indicate that an understanding of torture that is narrower than
international and domestic laws brings confusion, inconsistency, and abuse
to the interrogation system. It is also important to remember that the
departures triggered by the Bybee Memo led the U.S. to experience the
shame of the Abu Ghraib scandal. Sacrificing legitimacy for the sake of
national security interests will damage the country's image and will invite
enemies to justify their action on behalf of the human rights violations
committed by the U.S. Furthermore, narrowing the definition of torture will
lead to disrespect for racial and cultural differences which will only darken
the country's reputation. Creating a clear and broad definition of torture in
conjunction with faithful adherence to international norms and values will
help the United States fight the war on terrorism with effectiveness and
success.
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